Sandra Poll v. James Cook Poll : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
Sandra Poll v. James Cook Poll : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brent Young; Ivie & Young; Attorneys for Appellee.
Matthew R. Howell; Fillmore Spencer; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Poll v. Poll, No. 20100765 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2509
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SANDRA POLL, 
Petitioner-Appellee, 
JAMES COOK POLL, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
CASE NO. 20100765-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT'S SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE 
OF DIVORCE, IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE FRED D. 
HOWARD, PRESIDING. 
Brent Young 
Ivie & Young 
226 West 2230 North #210 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Matthew R. Howell (6571) 
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Appellee Attorneys for Appellant 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAP n n 9fli1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SANDRA POLL, 
Petitioner-Appellee, 
JAMES COOK POLL, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
CASE NO. 20100765-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT'S SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE 
OF DIVORCE, IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE FRED D. 
HOWARD, PRESIDING. 
Brent Young 
Ivie & Young 
226 West 2230 North #210 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Matthew R. Howell (6571) 
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Appellee Attorneys for Appellant 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. Sandra's Brief Mischaracterizes the Relevant Standard of 
Review and the Applicable Marshalling Requirement 1 
II. The Trial Court's Finding of Fact that Sandra Did Not 
Intend to Make a Gift of the Wasatch Property Is Clearly 
Erroneous 6 
III. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Relief Because James' 
Transfer to Sandra of the Wasatch Property "Would 
Constitute a Potentially Fraudulent Transfer" 14 
CONCLUSION 20 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 (Utah App. 1987) 5-6 
Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, 993 P.2d 997 13 n.4 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) 12 n.3 
Carr v. Allison Turbine Div. Gen. Motors, 32 F.3d 1007, 1008 (7th Cir. 
1994) 4 
Concrete Pipe & Prod. OfCal, Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 
U.S. 602 (1993) 4 
Hone v. Hone, 2004 UT App 241, 95 P.3d 1221 17 n.9 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980) 13 n.5 
Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, 217 P.3d 733 2 
N.D. v. A.B., 2003 UT App 215, 73 P.3d 971 4 
Olson v. Olson, 2010 UT App 22, 226 P.3d 751 2 
Ross'Estate v.Ross, 626 P.2d 489 (Utah 1981) 13 n.4 
S.B.D. v. State, 2006 UT 54, 147, P.3d 401 4-5 
W. Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991) 2-3 
Statutes 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1) 17 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8)(b) 17n.l0 
Rules 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) 3-5 
Other Authorities 
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) 13 
5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 12 n.3 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971) 5 




JAMES COOK POLL, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
Case No. 20100765-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Respondent-Appellant James Cook ("James") hereby files his Reply Brief in 
response to the brief filed by Petitioner-Appellee Sandra Poll ("Sandra"). For the 
reasons stated below as well as in James' opening brief, the Court should reverse 
the trial court's finding that Sandra did not intend to give the Wasatch property to 
James or the marital estate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Sandra's Brief Mischaracterizes the Relevant Standard of Review and 
the Applicable Marshalling Requirement 
In his opening brief, James noted that an appellate court will make changes 
to "a trial court's property division determination in a divorce action only if there 
was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion" and that the 
"factual findings on which its determination is based are reviewed for clear error." 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 24 (citing Olson v. Olson, 2010 UT App 22, fflf 7, 9, 
226P.3d751). 
In opposition, Sandra correctly noted that when an appellate court is called 
on to conduct a clear error review, the party requesting such is required to marshal 
the evidence. Appellee's Brief at 1-2. Sandra then, however, incorrectly described 
that marshalling burden as being so heavy that it is virtually impossible to meet: 
Indeed, in an appeal arising out of a bench trial where the district 
court relies on live testimony in making its findings, marshalling may 
prove to be a near practical impossibility because the district court has 
within its perception factors that do not translate well into the record. 
Factors such as witness demeanor, body language or other non-verbal 
cues that can influence a trial court's findings of credibility and 
veracity are difficult, if not nearly impossible, to incorporate in the 
record. 
Appellee's Brief at 7-8. This is a misstatement of the standard of review and of the 
marshalling requirement. 
First, the marshalling requirement simply requires "the challenger [to] 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Kimball 
v. Kimball 2009 UT App 233, f 21, 217 P.3d 733 (quoting West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co,, 818P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. \99\)\ quoted in Appellee's 
Brief at 2. The marshalling burden does not require a description of how a witness 
was shaking uncontrollably or how the trial judge rolled his eyes and shook his 
head when certain testimony was presented. Rather, as required by Rule 52(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court is merely required to give "due 
regard . . . to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses," a requirement which James fully acknowledges in this matter. 
Moreover, Sandra has not identified a single fact that James failed to 
marshal. In other words, despite the terrible burden that Sandra insists James must 
bear in this matter, Sandra cannot find any flaw in James' carrying of that burden. 
Indeed, the most that Sandra can say is that "Mr. Poll may not have adequately 
marshaled the evidence that supports the finding." Appellee's Brief at 7 (emphasis 
added). If a truly motivated party to the litigation cannot muster a single omission 
by the opposing party, no matter how minute, it stands to reason that the burden 
has been fully met. 
In a similar vein, Sandra argues that "if there is competent evidence 
supportive of the finding, the finding must stand." Appellee's Brief at 8. This is 
an inaccurate statement of the standard of review. Rather, the appellate court may 
reverse a trial court's finding of fact if it is against the clear weight of the evidence 
or if the appellate court is firmly convinced an error has been made. N.D. v. A.B., 
2003 UT App 215,^ 12, 73 P.3d 971. 
Sandra further argues that, because it involves an appeal from a bench trial, 
the standard of review in this case is impossibly burdensome. Appellee's Brief at 
7. This too is in error. Our supreme court has given guidance in how this Court 
should review the factual findings of the trial court made after a trial to the bench. 
In S.B.D. v. State, 2006 UT 54, 147, P.3d 401, the court wrote: 
Judge Richard Posner made an able attempt to give practical 
meaning to the rule 52(a) standard when he wrote: 
It requires us appellate judges to distinguish 
between the situation in which we think that if we had 
been the trier of fact we would have decided the case 
differently and the situation in which we are firmly 
convinced that we would have done so. Our scrutiny of 
the district judgefs findings of fact thus is deferential, but 
it is not abject. As the Supreme Court pointed out in 
the Concrete Pipe case, we need not, to overturn a 
finding under the clear-error standard, adjudge the 
finding "so unlikely that no reasonable person would find 
it to be true." 
Id., f 34 (quoting Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div. Gen. Motors, 32 F.3d 1007, 
1008 (7th Cir.1994) (underlining added; italics emphasis in original) (in turn 
quoting Concrete Pipe & Prod. ofCal, Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension 
Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993))). The S.B.D. court continued: 
Thus, an appellate court may consider whether the findings were 
made by ajudgeorby a jury. This distinction matters. An appellate 
court must indulge findings of fact made by a jury that support the 
& 
verdict. No such indulgence is required of findings made by a judge. 
We made this point in Walker in the context of interpreting rule 
52(a) when we looked favorably to the position adopted by Wright & 
Miller concerning federal rule 52(a) that 
"[i]t is not accurate to say that the appellate court takes 
that view of the evidence that is most favorable to the 
appellee, that it assumes that all conflicts in the evidence 
were resolved in his favor, and that he must be given the 
benefit of all favorable inferences. All of this is true in 
reviewing a jury verdict. It is not true when it is findings 
of the court that are being reviewed." 
S.B.D., 2006 UT 54,135 (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (1987) (in 
turn quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971) 
(citations omitted))). 
Accordingly, unlike the review of a jury verdict and contrary to Sandra's 
description of this Court's obligation here, an appellate court is not required to 
affirm the trial court's findings of fact simply because there is some evidence in 
the record that may support them. Rather, it is to examine "the entire factual 
record" to determine whether it is "is left with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed." S.B.D., 2006 UT 54, fflf 38-39. 
That is precisely what this Court did in Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 
(Utah App. 1987). In that case, the trial court made a finding of fact that the 
purchasers of a piece of land under a periodic-payment contract had exhibited an 
intent to abandon the land when they stopped making the required payments 
several years into performance. Upon a review of the record, this court noted that 
S 
there was evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion, i.e., the failure to make 
any payment toward the obligation for three-year period of time. The court went 
on to note, however, that there were substantial facts weighing against a finding of 
an intent to abandon. These included multiple visits to the land by the purchasers 
and the exercise (through a proxy) of a landowner's right to vote at the 
organizational meeting of a proposed water rights association. Id. at 851-52. The 
court further noted that the opposing party had previously tolerated late payments. 
Id. at 852. Based on these additional facts in the record, the court "concluded that 
the court's finding of abandonment is against the clear weight of the evidence and, 
as such, is clearly erroneous and must be set aside." Id. 
James is asking this Court to follow this pattern in this case. James 
acknowledges that there is certain evidence in the record that, if taken alone, would 
support the trial court's factual finding that Sandra did not intend to make a gift of 
the Wasatch property to James and the marital estate. As shown below and in 
James' opening brief, however, a review of all of the evidence should leave the 
Court with the firm conviction that that finding is erroneous. 
II. The Trial Court's Finding of Fact That Sandra Did Not Intend to Make 
a Gift of the Wasatch Property Is Clearly Erroneous 
Sandra's incorrect formulation of the standard of review leads directly to her 
inadequate analysis of the matter before this Court. She begins by spending pages 
explaining all of the evidence that supports the trial court's factual findings. 
6 
Appellee's Brief at 10-14. Throughout this recitation, she repeatedly states that 
there is no "fatal flaw" in the trial court's reasoning. Therefore, according to 
Sandra, the trial court's findings must be affirmed. 
Sandra cites three facts that she claims support the trial court's finding that 
she did not intend to make a gift of the Wasatch property: 
(1) The purchase money for the Wasatch property originated from 
Sandra's separate property; 
(2) James did not have access to Sandra's premarital funds except as she 
may have given him the money and Sandra and James kept their 
property in separate accounts under individual names except when 
they intended it to become joint property; 
(3) Sandra's testimony that she did not intend to make the property a gift 
to James or the marital estate and that she did not think about putting 
James' name on the title when the land was purchased. 
Appellee's Brief at 10-11.1 In light of the discussion below, these facts are not 
sufficient to sustain the trial court's finding. 
First, the fact that the property was purchased by Sandra's separate funds 
does not provide any guidance in determining whether she wanted to give property 
The other facts cited by Sandra at this point in her brief all relate, not to whether 
there was a gift-giving intent, but to whether James acted with unclean hands when 
he transferred the property back to Sandra months later. Id. 
purchased with that money to James. That is, the source of a gift does not 
determine whether it was in fact a gift. Second, that James and Sandra kept their 
assets separate except when they put both names on the title (thereby indicating an 
intent to make the asset marital in nature) actually supports James' position in this 
matter because it is clear that they put both names on the title to the Wasatch 
property. Thus, the only evidence pointed to by Sandra that actually supports the 
trial court's finding is Sandra's testimony that she did not intend to give the 
property as a gift. As shown below, this one bit of conclusory, self-serving 
testimony is insufficient to preclude the trial court's finding from being set aside. 
In this entire process, Sandra never once acknowledges, let alone addresses, 
the actual "fatal flaw" that James described in his opening brief. Specifically, 
James points out that Sandra's conclusory, self-serving testimony on direct 
examination that she never intended to make a gift of the Wasatch property 
(Transcript at 44 ) was directly contrary to the testimony that she gave on cross 
examination. As described in James' opening brief, Sandra's testimony is as 
follows: 
11. Sandra testified that James' name was included on the 
REPC and the deed because "[w]e were married, and quite frankly, I 
hadn't - 1 didn't think about it at the time." (Transcript at 44.) She 
denied that she intended to make a gift to James of half the value of 
2
 This brief will follow the same convention for identifying transcripts as followed 
in James' opening brief. 
the Wasatch property. (Transcript at 44.) Then, she testified that she 
became concerned about his name being on the property shortly after 
they signed. (Transcript at 44.) Specifically, she testified: 
Q. Did there come a time when you became concerned about 
the fact that his name was on the property? 
A I was terribly concerned. 
Q My question is did there come a time? 
A Yes. 
Q When was that time? 
A Shortly after we signed the -
Q Why were you concerned? 
A Because I was afraid of just a situation as this, that - and my 
parents had told me that this could happen as well as my 
trustee. They said these documents need to be in your name. 
12. On cross examination, this same issue was covered and 
Sandra testified as follows: 
Q Did you at any time object to having the property put in both 
your names? 
A I don't believe at any time I actually stated that objection, 
but after the fact I was - it became a terrible concern of 
mine, as I stated before. 
Q And that was because your parents were advising you that 
that was a bad move? 
A Well, I knew it was a bad move. 
c\ 
Q . . . Your parents both advised you that it was bad for you to 
have it in both names? 
A Yes. And my trustee as well. 
Q And when did your trustee give you that advice? 
A I can't give you a specific date. I don't know. 
Q Before - before or -
A Before. 
Q - the purchase? 
A Yes. Before and after. Yes. 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 15-16 (quoting Transcript at 44-45 and 95-96). 
Indeed, Sandra's testimony that she "didn't think about it at the time" cannot be 
squared with her testimony that she "was afraid of just a situation as this, that - and 
my parents had told me that this could happen as well as my trustee." More 
especially, it cannot be squared with the testimony that she was warned by both her 
parents and her trustee that she should not put the property in both parties' names. 
This inconsistent testimony certainly should have weighed heavily against 
Sandra's credibility. More importantly, however, she has affirmatively provided 
evidence that supports James' theory of the case, i.e., by testifying that she knew of 
the risks associated with placing the Wasatch property in both parties' names but 
did it anyway. James submits that, when the party supporting the factual findings 
i n 
of the trial court actually provided testimony that directly undercuts those findings, 
that constitutes a "fatal flaw" sufficient to justify the reversal of those findings. 
Imagine, for instance, a hypothetical situation in which the defendant-
appellee was found by the trial court not to be liable for battery and the trial court 
specifically found that the defendant is not liable because he did not intend to 
commit a battery. Also imagine that at the trial, after the defendant testified on 
direct examination that he did not intend to commit a battery, on cross examination 
the defendant testified as follows: 
Q You previously testified that you did not intend to commit a 
battery against my client, is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q But isn't it true that you did throw the hammer, right? 
A That is true but I did not intend to commit a battery. 
Q And it is true that you threw the hammer as hard as you could, 
correct? 
A That is true but I did not intend to commit a battery. 
Q And isn't it true that before you even started to throw the 
hammer, you saw my client standing less than five feet in front 
of you? 
A That is true but I did not intend to commit a battery. 
11 
Q Is it not true that, as you threw the hammer, you knew or were 
reasonably certain that it would strike my client? 
A That is true but I did not intend to commit a battery. 
Q And you were quite certain that if that hammer struck my client 
it would cause substantial harm to him, right? 
A That is true but I did not intend to commit a battery. 
Given the nature of this testimony from the party that supports the trial 
court's factual findings, the appellate court would be remiss if it were to affirm the 
trial court's finding by simply citing to the defendant's direct examination 
testimony that he did not intend to commit a battery. This is so even though the 
defendant repeatedly stated that he did not intend to commit a battery. Indeed, it 
would be so even if there were even uncontested testimony that the defendant liked 
the plaintiff and did not wish any harm to come to him. The simple fact is that the 
defendant in this hypothetical confessed under oath before the court to committing 
a battery. His conclusory denial cannot protect him from liability. 
This is precisely what happened in this matter. After Sandra first testified 
that she did not intend to make a gift of the Wasatch property, she then testified to 
specific facts that completely undermine her position. She stated under oath that 
3
 Cross-examination has been referred to as "the greatest legal engine ever invented 
for the discovery of truth." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 
5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1367). 
12 
she was warned not to put the property in both names and that doing so would lead 
to "just a situation as this." In other words, she was aware of what she was doing 
and she chose to do it anyway. That is the very definition of "intend." Black's 
Law Dictionary 809 (6th ed. 1990) ("Intend. To design, resolve, propose. To plan 
for and expect a certain result."). Because she understood the likely consequences 
of the actions that she was taking, Sandra intended to make the Wasatch property 
the joint marital property of both herself and James. The trial court's finding to the 
contrary is clearly erroneous. 
Under any burden or standard of proof, Sandra's own testimony is 
sufficiently compelling that this Court should be firmly convinced that the trial 
court's finding that Sandra lacked donative intent is clearly erroneous.5 
4
 Sandra argues that James bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence that Sandra intended to make a gift of the property at issue. Appellee's 
Brief at 13 n.4, 16 n.5 (citing Ross' Estate v. Ross, 626 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1981). 
James believes that his eliciting of Sandra's testimony on cross examination more 
than meets this standard and burden. In actuality, however, it was Sandra's burden 
to disprove an intent to make a gift. In Bradford v. Bradford, this Court held that 
the transfer of separate property into a joint tenancy with the grantor's spouse is 
presumed to be a gift. 1999 UT App 373, % 22, 993 P.2d 887. Because it is 
undisputed that Sandra transferred her separate property (in the form of the 
purchase money) into a joint tenancy (in the form of the Wasatch property), absent 
evidence to the contrary, that transfer must be considered a gift. The only evidence 
to the contrary in this case is Sandra's own self-serving, conclusory testimony that 
there was no such intent, testimony that she contradicted on cross-examination. 
Indeed, Sandra's testimony distinguishes this case from the situation faced by the 
court in Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). In Jesperson, the 
court upheld the trial court's finding of no intent to make a gift. There was nothing 
1 a 
Accordingly, the Court should reverse the trial court's finding of fact that Sandra 
did not intend the Wasatch property to be a gift to James or the marital estate. 
III. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Relief Because James' Transfer to 
Sandra of the Wasatch Property "May Have Been Fraudulent" 
Turning to question of the effect of James' subsequent transfer of title to the 
Wasatch property to Sandra individually, it is important to note that Sandra has not 
contested James' argument that there was no evidence that James intended to 
alienate any interest he had in the Wasatch property. Rather, it is undisputed that 
James' sole intent in transferring title to the Wasatch property to Sandra was asset 
protection, that is, to make it more likely that the property could not be obtained by 
some future creditor. 
Instead of contesting this assertion by James, Sandra argues that this intent 
was so wrong that it was sufficient to deprive James of the right to seek the trial 
court's assistance in seeking equity. Specifically, Sandra argues that James has 
unclean hands.6 This argument is wrong on many levels and the trial court's 
erroneous conclusion must be reversed. 
in that case indicating that the alleged donor spouse placed the property in a joint 
tenancy after having been warned not to because a dispute over the division of the 
property could arise at the time of a divorce. 
6
 James specifically disputes the characterization of his position proffered by 
Sandra. Appellee's Brief at 19 n.6 (referring to James' argument in Appellant's 
Brief at 38). James did not concede that his conduct was inequitable. Rather, he 
\A 
First, the only basis the trial court gave for applying the doctrine of unclean 
hands was: "The court finds it would not be unreasonable to conclude that Mr. 
Poll's objective would constitute a potentially fraudulent conveyance." James 
established in his opening brief that there was no fraudulent conveyance. 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 36-42. Sandra has not disputed that. Indeed, she 
now argues that "the trial court never concluded a fraudulent transfer occurred." 
Appellee's Brief at 16. 
Rather, Sandra now asks this Court to "focus[] exclusively on Mr. Poll's 
intent." Id. Similarly, she asserts "that Mr. Poll's purpose behind transferring the 
property back to [Sandra] was an improper one." Id. at 17. The problem with this 
argument is that, even though she repeatedly makes the assertion, as did the trial 
court,8 neither Sandra nor the trial ever explained why the placing of an asset into a 
merely stated that however one might characterize his conduct, Sandra's conduct 
was more inequitable than his. 
Sandra argues that the proper standard of review of this issue is "abuse of 
discretion." In this, she errs. If the issue were simply whether the trial court 
equitably divided the marital estate, that would be the proper standard. Here, 
however, the issue is whether the trial court properly found that James' conduct 
was so unconscionable so as to properly allow the invocation of the unclean hands 
doctrine. Accordingly, clear error is the proper standard of review. 
E.g., Appellee's Brief at 17 ("Mr. Poll's purpose behind transferring the property 
. . . was an improper one. . . . Mr. Poll's intent was improper."); id. at 18 ("Mr. 
Poll's intent at the time . . . was improper[.] . . The transfer of the Wasatch 
Property out of Mr. Poll's hands was for an improper purpose.") (citing the trial 
court's findings). 
1 C 
particular ownership vehicle with the hope that the asset might be protected from 
future creditors is improper. Of course, if such a placement constituted a 
fraudulent transfer as defined by statute (which Sandra has now conceded is not the 
case here), the transfer may be undone at the instance of the offended creditor. 
That, however, does not mean that an attempt to protect the asset from an as yet 
unknown, indeed currently non-existent, creditor is wrong or improper in any real 
sense, certainly not in the sense that would raise the doctrine of unclean hands. 
Sandra's entire unclean hands argument relies on the idea that asset protection (the 
area of practice of a significant portion of the members of the bar of this state and 
all other American states) is so wrong that it should be the basis for denying a 
litigant justice. Sandra cites absolutely no authority for that position. 
In fact, whenever the doctrine of unclean hands is applied, the court is 
essentially saying that it would be just and equitable for the court to grant one party 
certain relief but, because of something that party has done, that party does not 
deserve to receive equity. In other words, in applying the unclean hands doctrine, 
a court effectively decides that it is willing to allow an unfair or unjust result to 
stand because of some supervening wrong. In order to prevent courts from 
becoming participants in truly wrongful conduct, the unclean hands doctrine 
certainly has a place in American jurisprudence. That place, however, should be 
strictly limited to those situations where its application is genuinely necessary. To 
16 
hold otherwise would often make the courts party to inequitable results, which is, 
of course, directly contrary to the courts' very purpose. 
In addition, James has not found a single example of a Utah court actually 
applying the doctrine of unclean hands in a divorce case.9 This should not be 
surprising when one considers that the legislature has commanded the courts to do 
equity in divorce cases. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(l).10 But, as noted above, the 
application of unclean hands results in a court not doing equity and nothing in the 
statute purports to permit that. 
Moreover, in the large majority of divorce cases, at least one of the litigants 
could probably legitimately argue that the other has come to the court with unclean 
hands. Because of that, it should be clear that the application of this doctrine to 
divorce cases would open the proverbial can of worms that could not be easily 
9
 This further distinguishes the case of Hone v. Hone, 2004 UT App 241, 95 P.3d 
1221, which was relied on both by Sandra and by the trial court. Because that case 
was not a divorce case, it provides little guidance in how the doctrine of unclean 
hands should be applied in this case. 
Indeed, Utah's divorce statute specifically grants the trial court the authority to 
consider fault in the determination of alimony. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(b). 
There is no corresponding provision that allows the consideration of fault in the 
determination of property distribution. Under the statutory construction maxim 
"inclusio unius est exclusio alterius", the Court must conclude that by not 
including property distribution within the provision allowing for fault 
consideration, the legislature must have intended to exclude such consideration. 
Accordingly, the Court should refuse consider whether James was at fault in any 
way in determining whether he should have been awarded a portion of the value of 
the Wasatch property. 
1 7 
reclosed. For instance, in every divorce case in which one of the parties committed 
adultery, the other party could assert that that party has unclean hands and 
therefore should not be allowed by the court to seek equity. In other words, any 
adulterer would not be entitled to ask for alimony or an equitable division of the 
marital property. The same would be true for cases involving those who may have 
hit their spouse or their child, or those who spent marital funds without the 
knowledge of the other for a purpose that would not have been approved by the 
other. 
To further complicate the matter, in many divorce cases, both parties will 
have behaved badly. In such an instance, if the doctrine of unclean hands is to be 
applied, it would have to preclude the court from providing any relief to either 
party, a result that is directly contrary to the intent of the legislature in enacting no-
fault divorce legislation.11 
If one were to accept Sandra's characterization of the property transferee., 
that it was like a fraudulent transfer and therefore caused the participants to have 
unclean hands), then the problem of both parties in this case have unclean hands. 
11
 This entire idea would open up divorce cases to the issue of fault to such a 
degree that the benefits of the enactment of no-fault divorce by our legislature 
would largely be rendered a nullity. Divorce courts would be required to listen to 
allegations that one spouse hit the other and the counter argument that it was 
purely defensive or it wasn't very hard. 
18 
If the transfer of the Wasatch property from Sandra to James was fraudulent and 
caused him to have unclean hands, then, because the evidence was clear at the trial 
that Sandra participated in that transfer knowing of its allegedly fraudulent 
purpose, she too has unclean hands. 
This Court should not allow Sandra to deprive James of his interest in the 
Wasatch property, which was marital property, simply because he tried to protect 
that property for both his and Sandra's benefit, and not in any way that has been 
shown to be improper or wrongful. 
m 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons as well as those stated in James' opening 
brief, James asks this Court to reverse the decision of the trial court, hold that the 
Wasatch County Property was marital property and hold that he is entitled to a 
one-half interest therein. This Court should then remand this case to the trial court 
for entry of an order awarding James one-half the value of the Wasatch property, 
as proven at trial. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 2011. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
Matthew R. Howell 
3301 N. University Avenue 
Provo,Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant 
on 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, this 9th day of 
March, 2011, to the following: 
Brent Young 
Ivie & Young 
226 West 2230 North #210 
Provo, Utah 84603 
91 
